Greg Kroah-Hartman
598cf27219
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260217200002.683975158@linuxfoundation.org Tested-by: Florian Fainelli <florian.fainelli@broadcom.com> Tested-by: Takeshi Ogasawara <takeshi.ogasawara@futuring-girl.com> Tested-by: Peter Schneider <pschneider1968@googlemail.com> Tested-by: Jon Hunter <jonathanh@nvidia.com> Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org> Tested-by: Brett A C Sheffield <bacs@librecast.net> Tested-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Tested-by: Luna Jernberg <droidbittin@gmail.com> Tested-by: Ronald Warsow <rwarsow@gmx.de> Tested-by: Justin M. Forbes <jforbes@fedoraproject.org> Tested-by: Ron Economos <re@w6rz.net> Tested-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
18 lines
473 B
Plaintext
18 lines
473 B
Plaintext
# Basic kernel hardening options (specific to x86)
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# Modern libc no longer needs a fixed-position mapping in userspace, remove
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# it as a possible target.
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CONFIG_LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE=y
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# Enable chip-specific IOMMU support.
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CONFIG_INTEL_IOMMU=y
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CONFIG_INTEL_IOMMU_DEFAULT_ON=y
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CONFIG_INTEL_IOMMU_SVM=y
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CONFIG_AMD_IOMMU=y
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# Enforce CET Indirect Branch Tracking in the kernel.
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CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT=y
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# Enable CET Shadow Stack for userspace.
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CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK=y
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