Files
cubelinux-kernel/security/selinux/ss/context.c
T
Greg Kroah-Hartman 598cf27219 Linux 6.19.3
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260217200002.683975158@linuxfoundation.org
Tested-by: Florian Fainelli <florian.fainelli@broadcom.com>
Tested-by: Takeshi Ogasawara <takeshi.ogasawara@futuring-girl.com>
Tested-by: Peter Schneider <pschneider1968@googlemail.com>
Tested-by: Jon Hunter <jonathanh@nvidia.com>
Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
Tested-by: Brett A C Sheffield <bacs@librecast.net>
Tested-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Luna Jernberg <droidbittin@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Ronald Warsow <rwarsow@gmx.de>
Tested-by: Justin M. Forbes <jforbes@fedoraproject.org>
Tested-by: Ron Economos <re@w6rz.net>
Tested-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2026-02-19 16:33:27 +01:00

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867 B
C

/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
/*
* Implementations of the security context functions.
*
* Author: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnacek@gmail.com>
* Copyright (C) 2020 Red Hat, Inc.
*/
#include <linux/jhash.h>
#include "context.h"
#include "mls.h"
u32 context_compute_hash(const struct context *c)
{
u32 hash = 0;
/*
* If a context is invalid, it will always be represented by a
* context struct with only the len & str set (and vice versa)
* under a given policy. Since context structs from different
* policies should never meet, it is safe to hash valid and
* invalid contexts differently. The context_equal() function
* already operates under the same assumption.
*/
if (c->len)
return full_name_hash(NULL, c->str, c->len);
hash = jhash_3words(c->user, c->role, c->type, hash);
hash = mls_range_hash(&c->range, hash);
return hash;
}